Rhode Island v. Innis Supreme Court Case, Arguments, Impact

In Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), the Supreme Court created the functionally equivalent standard for determining when police officers are interrogating a suspect. The Court ruled that an interrogation is not limited to direct questioning, but instead covers any actions that can be reasonably understood as coercive. Fast Facts: Rhode Island v. Innis Case Argued: October 30, 1979Decision Issued:  May 12,1980Petitioner:  Rhode IslandRespondent:  Thomas J. InnisKey Questions: What constitutes an interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona? Did police officers violate Innis right to remain silent when they expressed concerns about the location of a weapon while transporting Innis to the police station?Majority Decision: Justices Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, RehnquistDissenting: Justices Brennan, Marshall, StevensRuling:  Under precedent set in Miranda v. Arizona, coercive conduct could be functionally equivalent to an interrogation. Facts of the Case Four days after he went missing, police recovered the body of John Mulvaney, a Providence, Rhode Island, taxicab driver. He appeared to have died from a shotgun blast. A few days after uncovering the body in a shallow grave in Coventry, Rhode Island, police received a report of a robbery in which the assailant had used a sawed-off shotgun to threaten a taxicab driver. The driver identified his assailant twice at the police station using photos. Police began to search for the suspect. A patrolman spotted Thomas J. Innis at 4:30 a.m. The patrolman placed Innis under arrest, advising him of his Miranda rights. Innis was unarmed. A sergeant and captain arrived on the scene and again advised Innis of his rights. This time, Innis requested an attorney and the captain made it clear that the patrolmen accompanying Innis to the police station were not to question him. During the ride, two of the officers began to discuss concerns about gun safety. There was a school for children with disabilities in the neighborhood. The officers suggested that if a child found the discarded shotgun, they might injure themselves trying to play with it. Innis interrupted the conversation and told the officers where he had hidden the gun. During the search for the weapon, the officers again advised Innis of his rights. Innis said he understood his rights, but wanted to make sure that the gun was out of reach of children in the area. Constitutional Issues The Fifth Amendment ensures that an individual has the right to remain silent until they can speak with an attorney. Did the conversation between officers seated in the front of the car violate Innis Fifth Amendment right to remain silent? Did the officers interrogate Innis during the drive to the police station, despite Innis request for an attorney? Arguments Unlike some cases stemming from the Miranda v. Arizona decision, neither attorney argued that Innis was not properly advised of his rights. Neither attorney argued whether Innis was or was not in custody during transport to the police station. Instead, the attorney representing Innis argued that officers had violated Innis right to remain silent when they questioned him after  he asked for an attorney. The conversation about gun danger was a tactic used to get Innis to cooperate, the attorney argued. That tactic should be included within the Courts definition of an interrogation, according to the attorney. The government claimed that the conversation between officers did not concern Innis. They never prompted a response from Innis and did not explicitly question him during the ride. Information about where the shotgun was located was freely offered by Innis, the attorney argued. Majority Opinion Justice Potter Stewart delivered the 6-3 decision in favor of Rhode Island. The majority expanded the meaning of the word interrogation as it applies to Miranda warnings. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court was concerned about the interrogation environment, an atmosphere created by actions that could exist outside of a police station. The case noted that there were many police tactics, such as psychological ploys and coached witnesses, that could violate a suspects rights but were not based on verbal communication with the suspect.   Justice Stewart wrote: That is to say, the term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The Court noted that, in Innis case, the conversation between patrolmen on the way to the police station was not functionally equivalent to an interrogation. The officers had no way of knowing their conversation would encourage a response from Innis, the Court found. Nothing in the record suggested that an appeal to the safety of children would coerce Innis into revealing the location of the weapon. Dissenting Opinion Justices John Marshall and William J. Brennan agreed with the way the majority defined the term interrogation but reached a different outcome in terms of Innis case. Justice Marshall argued that it would be difficult to find a more targeted appeal to someones conscience than the death of a helpless, handicapped little girl. The officers should have known that their conversation was going to have an emotional impact on the suspect, the justices argued. In a separate dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued for a different definition of interrogation. According to Justice Stevens, interrogation is any type of conduct that has the same purpose or effect as a direct statement. Impact The Supreme Court developed a standard for interrogation under Miranda that is still used today. The case added to jurisprudence expanding and clarifying key aspects of the landmark 1966 ruling. In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court affirmed that Miranda v. Arizona was not written to solely safeguard suspects from direct questioning while waiting for an attorney, but other functionally equivalent acts of coercion as well. Sources Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).Schutzman, Alan M. â€Å"Rhode Island v. Innis.† Hofstra Law Review, vol. 9, no. 2, 1981.